OVER THE PAST TWO YEARS, improving safety at highway-rail grade crossings has been at the forefront of the U.S. Department of Transportation (USDOT) agenda, as well as the agendas of many state departments of transportation, railroad companies, regional transportation agencies and professional organizations. Many of these activities stemmed from the Oct. 25, 1995, collision between a commuter train and a school bus in a suburb outside of Chicago, Ill., USA. The school bus transporting 35 high-school students crossed a set of railroad tracks and then stopped for red traffic-signal indications at an adjacent intersection in the City of Fox River Grove. While stopped, the rear of the school bus extended across the railroad tracks where it was struck by an express METRA commuter train inbound to Chicago. Seven children died as a result of the collision, and 24 others were injured.
As a result of this tragic collision, the USDOT convened a Grade Crossing Safety Task Force, Technical Working Group (TWG) to "review existing standards and guidelines and develop new ones, if appropriate, on several grade crossing safety issues." 1 One of the important albeit unheralded results was the consensus reached between railwaysignal and highway-traffic-signal communities on certain terms and definitions relative to the interconnection and preemption of traffic signals near highwayrail grade crossings. This feature will discuss the term "interconnection," its relation to modern traffic signals and a recently introduced enhancement. As defined by TWG, "interconnection" is "the electrical connection between the railroad active warning system and the traffic signal controller assembly for the purpose of preemption." "Preemption" is defined as "the transfer of normal operation of signals to a special control mode." 1 The special control mode: 1) terminates the traffic-signal intervals in operation, 2) clears motor vehicles off the tracks, 3) allows flashing operation or selected traffic movements that are compatible with the train passage to use the intersection until preemption is released (when the train clears the highway-rail grade crossing) and 4) returns the traffic signals to normal operation.
We should not only consider the terms "interconnection" and "preemption" but also the following terms:
• Traffic-signal controller assembly-A complete electrical device mounted in a cabinet for controlling the operations of a traffic-control signal; 2 • Traffic-signal controller unitThat part of a controller assembly that is devoted to the selection and timing of signal phase; 2 • Preemptor-An external device or an internal controller-unit program routine, which provides preemption; 2 and • Preemption routine-The series of traffic-signal intervals that, following receipt of a preemption input, are used to: 1) leave normal signal operation, 2) clear the track(s), 3) hold the signal during continuation of the preemption input and 4) return to normal operation. Before examining interconnection in more detail, it is important to understand the complex relationships between highway-rail grade crossings and nearby highway-highway intersections, especially those that are signalized. Warning devices at highway-rail grade crossings immediately take away right of way from motor vehicles to allow an approaching train to pass without slowing or stopping, no matter when it arrives. Meanwhile, traffic signals at intersections alternately assign right of way to motor-vehicle movements according to some predetermined pro- gram. In order for nearby traffic signals to safely accommodate an approaching train that will not stop, they need to be informed that a train is approaching. To notify traffic-signal controllers that a train is approaching, they must be interconnected with the railroad grade-crossing warning equipment.
As stated in Part VIII of the 1988 edition of the Manual on Uniform Traffic Control Devices for Streets and Highways (MUTCD), preemption of traffic signals "requires an electrical circuit between the control relay of the grade crossing warning system and the traffic controller. The circuit shall be of the closed circuit principle, that is, the traffic signal controller is normally energized and the circuit is wired through a closed contact of the energized control relay of the grade crossing warning system." 3 This interconnection circuit consists of either wires in conduit that run between the railroad grade-crossing warning equipment cabinet (or nearby pull box) and the trafficsignal equipment cabinet (or nearby pull box) or by directly burying cable in the ground between the two points. When a train approaches, a railroad grade-crossing warning equipment control relay, sometimes referred to as the XR relay, is de-energized, which in turn de-energizes a preemption relay in the railroad gradecrossing warning equipment cabinet. This de-energizes a preemption control relay (or control light source in modern traffic-signal-control equipment) in the traffic-signal equipment cabinet, notifying the traffic-signal controller assembly to enter the special control mode. Figure 1 represents the interconnection circuit as used in older traffic-signal controller units, including the National Electrical Manufacturers Association (NEMA) TS 1 with an external preemptor. The power source in the traffic-signal equipment cabinet keeps the coil of the preemption control relay energized through the interconnection circuit and the contacts of the preemption relay, whose coil is normally energized when there is no train approaching ( Figure  1A ). When a train approaches, the XR relay is de-energized, de-energizing the preemption relay, allowing its contacts to open (or "drop"). When the preemptionrelay contacts open, the interconnection circuit opens, de-energizing the preemption control relay, whose contacts close the circuit to the external preemptor ( Figure 1B ). When electrical current flows to the preemptor input, preemption is initiated in the traffic-signal controller assembly.
Modern traffic-signal controller units have the capability to run preemption routines internally, without an external preemptor. However, these controller units are not designed to accept conventional electrical inputs. Instead all inputs enter the controller unit via isolation devices, which serve to electrically isolate the controller unit from external voltages. De-energizing the preemption relay again results in a preemption input to the traffic-signal controller unit, now via the isolation device, which uses a control light source (instead of a control relay) and a light-sensitive receiver (instead of control-relay contacts).
This normally energized circuit arrangement, as required by the MUTCD, is considered "fail-safe." In the railway-signal industry, a device is considered "fail-safe" if it fails in its most restrictive mode. In the case of the interconnection circuit, if there is a break in either or both wires/cables of the circuit, the traffic-signal controller unit would respond as if a train is approaching, clearing motor vehicles off the tracks, even though a train may indeed not be approaching. Unless some "time-out" feature is incorporated, the traffic signals will remain in the preemption routine as long as the circuit remains broken. Moreover, although the traffic-signal preemption routine would have already cleared motor vehicles off the tracks, the active warning devices (e.g., flashing light signals, automatic gates) would not be activated, because a train has not actually been detected approaching the crossing and could not warn or prevent further motor vehicles from encroaching on the tracks. If a train approaches during such a malfunction, the active warning devices will activate, yet traffic-signal preemption cannot be initiated to clear vehicles off the tracks because the traffic signal is already in its preemption routine.
To address these potential problems with the standard interconnection circuit, the latest rewrite of Part VIII of the MUTCD states that this circuit should be either of the closed-circuit type or the supervised type. 4 Supervising the interconnection circuit is intended to mitigate the problems described above.
Supervised interconnection circuits notify the traffic-signal controller if there is a problem with the physical Figure 1 . Typical interconnection circuit.
wires or cables that run between the railroad grade-crossing warning equipment and traffic-signal equipment. Potential problems include a utility or contractor inadvertently digging up and severing the wire/cable, or loose wire/cable connections in one or both of the cabinets.
With a supervised interconnection circuit, the traffic-signal controller assembly detects a broken circuit differently than the open circuit resulting from the opening of the preemption relay contacts and responds as programmed. One possible response includes first clearing the tracks and then displaying all-way flashing-red signal indications, which quickly gain the attention of local authorities that a problem exists and allow all traffic movements at the intersection to progress. All-way flashing red is probably more appropriate than flashing-yellow (major street)/flashing-red (minor street) trafficsignal indications if the minor street is the one crossing the railroad tracks. With flashing-yellow/flashing-red signal indications, it may be more difficult for motorists to clear the tracks should a train approach since they would have to wait for a gap in major street traffic.
SUPERVISED INTERCONNECTION CIRCUITRY
Figures 2A through 2C illustrate one possible supervised interconnection circuit. Each figure shows the relays and relay contacts that are part of the railroad grade-crossing warning equipment and those that are part of the traffic-signal equipment. The three wires/cables shown as running between the railroad gradecrossing warning equipment and trafficsignal equipment are the interconnection wires/cables that could accidentally be severed. The relay-controller cabinet interlock circuit in the traffic-signal equipment simply identifies to the trafficsignal-controller assembly that preemption control relay 1 and supervision control relay 2 are present. If either or both of these relays were to be removed from the controller cabinet, the trafficsignal controller could be programmed to respond by entering an all-way flashingred mode. In Figures 2A through 2C , control relays 1 and 2 each have three sets of relay contacts that are opened and closed (move up and drop down) together when the relay coils are energized and de-energized respectively. As in Figure 1 , opening of the preemption relay contacts in the railroad grade-crossing warning equipment cabinet indicates that a train is approaching the highway-rail grade crossing. If no train is approaching (Figure 2A) , the preemption relay coil (not shown) is energized and the upper contacts closed, allowing current from the alternating current (AC) or direct current (DC) control voltage to energize control relay 1. If a train is approaching (Figure 2B ), the preemption relay coil is de-energized and its lower contacts closed, allowing current from the AC or DC control voltage to energize control relay 2. Under normal conditions, control relays 1 and 2 would not be deenergized together. The de-energizing of both control relays 1 and 2 indicates that a break has occurred in the interconnection wire/cable. The condition in Figure 2C is identified as "supervision fail," and the traffic-signal controller assembly is notified that something is wrong with the interconnection wire/cable and will respond as programmed.
SHORT CIRCUITS
One potential problem not addressed above is a short in the interconnection circuit. As shown in Figure 3 , if the two wires/cables between the traffic-signal equipment cabinet and the railroad grade-crossing warning equipment cabinet became shorted together, the control relay in the traffic-signal equipment cabinet would remain falsely energized even if the preemption relay contact opened because of an approaching train. The active warning devices would be operating, but the traffic-signal controller unit would not receive the preemption input.
A possible solution to the problem of a short circuit is to place the AC or DC control voltage source at the other end of the circuit, away from the control relay(s). Railroad signal designers have used this principle to design wayside signals that control train movements along railroad tracks since the early years of railroading. Section 236.206 of the Code of Federal Regulations (49 CFR 236.206) requires all railroad signaling circuits to be designed so that "The battery or power supply for each signal control relay circuit, where an open-wire circuit or common return circuit is used, shall be located at the end of the circuit farthest from the relay." 5 The historic intent of this regulation was to prevent crossed wires on a pole line, as found alongside the tracks of many rail lines with older signaling systems, from falsely bypassing a relay contact in a circuit so as to cause an unsafe situation.
By placing the power source at the far end of the circuit, crossed wires/cables would put a short across the circuit resulting in the de-energizing of the control relay(s) (Figure 4) . The disadvantage is that the power supply must be located in the railroad grade-crossing warning equipment cabinet, making troubleshooting and maintenance difficult by other than railroad-signal personnel. Another method of achieving the same result with the power supply in the traffic-signal equipment cabinet is shown in Figure 5 . The redundant wires/cables and relay contacts are referred to as "double-break, four-wire" circuit in railroad-signaling terms. A single short between any two wires/cables cannot cause an unsafe condition, such as the control relay being falsely energized.
The supervised interconnection circuit as presented in Figure 2 also could have this short circuit problem; a short in the wires/cables could cause control relay 1 to remain falsely energized. A solution to this is shown in Figure 6 , which presents a supervised interconnection circuit that employs the "double-break" concept. Only one or the other relay can be energized, allowing broken wires/cables to be detected, and no single circuit short can cause an unsafe condition. 
CONSIDERATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS
These potential problems with the standard closed-circuit interconnection wiring schemes (Figure 1 ) are considered to be rare (based on discussions with department of transportation representatives from California, Illinois and Oregon), particularly if the interconnection wires are placed in metal or plastic conduit with concrete encasement. However, if such a problem did occur (e.g., a loose connection in one of the cabinets), it could have devastating, tragic consequences, potentially trapping motor vehicles on the tracks when a train approaches. The American Railway Engineering and Maintenance-of-way Association's (AREMA's) railway signaling group is planning to address this issue in 1999. The Institute of Transportation Engineers (ITE) also should address these issues, developing national recommended practices, perhaps through the "Highway-Rail Intersection" Traffic Engineering Council Committee or in a joint effort with AREMA.
Many issues remain unresolved and open for further discussion and input. For example, should all "two-wire" interconnections be upgraded to three or six wires? Should interconnection wires be required to be in conduit, or should only new interconnections be installed with the above functions? It may also be possible, by using more than two wires running between the traffic-signal equipment and the railroad grade-crossing warning equipment, for railroad event recorders to monitor some of the traffic-signal operations and report malfunctions, such as an all-way flashing red, to the railroad dispatch center, which in turn could notify the appropriate highway department. In the meantime, railroads and highway traffic authorities should continue improving coordination efforts on the design, operation and maintenance of traffic signals provided with preemption. This should include joint inspections as outlined in the Implementation Report of the USDOT Grade Crossing Safety Task Force: A Report to Secretary Rodney E. Slater. 1 For further discussion or input on this topic, please contact one of the authors or address your input to ITE's "HighwayRail Intersection" Traffic Engineering Council Committee (TENC-96-04). s 
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